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Abstract 
Consequences of path-dependent supply side on the market equilibrium are illustrated. Supply 
is only a subsystem of the entire market with its forcing variable (price) being endogenous 
from the perspective of the entire market. This results in feedbacks on the equilibrium of price 
and quantity if transient exogenous disturbances occur. Aggregate hysteresis is modelled by 
continuous dynamics showing similarities to ‘mechanical play’. This contrast the standard 
firm level modelling of hysteresis resulting from discontinuous (activity/inactivity) switches. 
Play dynamics are captured in a simple linearized way, just by adding two parameters to a 
supply equation. 
JEL Codes: C39; C51; C61. 
Keywords: path-dependence; play-hysteresis; modelling techniques 
– 2 – 
1. Introduction 
The term “hysteresis” – originally stemming from physics and magnetism – generally 
describes permanent effects of a temporary stimulus, i.e. a past and only temporary change of 
the relevant economic determinants (technically: the input or the forcing variables) results in a 
permanent change of the economic behaviour (as the output or dependent variable).1 
Hysteresis characterizes systems with path-dependent multiple equilibria: As a consequence, 
the observed behaviour of the system does not only rely on the current levels of the forcing 
variables, but also depends on the initial conditions and the past realisations of the input 
variables (Cross/Allan, 1988, p. 26). Typically, hysteresis in economics is based on sunk 
adjustment costs: standard examples are hiring-/firing costs in labour markets and entry-/exit-
costs in international export markets.2 The starting point is usually the path-dependent 
behavioural pattern on the micro level of a single unit (firm), being – under consideration of 
the past spending of sunk-costs – active on a market or not. Thus, the path-dependent 
switching of the activity status at specific triggers is to be modelled on a micro level. 
However, aggregation over a multiplicity of heterogeneous agents is not straightforward and 
results in a more complex aggregate path-dependent pattern of the entire aggregate economic 
system. The aggregate path-dependence (as may be known from the magnetic hysteresis-loop 
of an entire piece of iron) is not characterised by discontinuous switches (between activity and 
inactivity), but by a smooth/continuous transition between different “branches” of the input-
output-relation, which occurs when the direction of the movement of the forcing variable 
changes. In this paper a simple method is applied to model this dynamics on an aggregate 
level by a procedure which shows similarities to the phenomenon of play in mechanics. By 
adding only two additional parameters to a linear relation, the complex path-dependent pattern 
on an aggregate level is captured by an approximation based on linear segments. 
                                                 
1 The terms 'input' and 'output' are used in a technical manner and not in a narrow economic sense (as e.g. 
production output and factor input). 
2 For labour markets see Blanchard/Summers (1986), Lindbeck/Snower (1986), and Bentolila/Bertola (1990); 
for international trade see Baldwin (1989), Baldwin/Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989, 1990). See Cross 
(1993), Göcke (2002) and Cross/Grinfeld/Lamba (2009) for an overview of hysteresis in economics. 
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Furthermore, due to the dynamic complexity, hysteresis in economics is often modelled with 
an exogenous forcing variable. However, the forcing variable of the hysteretic subsystem (as 
e.g. the exchange rate for the entry/exit decision in international markets, or the wage for 
hiring/firing decisions) is usually an endogenous variable from the perspective of the whole 
economic system. Thus, permanent effects of transient changes of the forcing variable 
eventually result in a feed-back effect of the system on the equilibrium level of the forcing 
variable itself (Baldwin/Lyons, 1994; Cross/McNamara/Pokrovskii/Kalačev, 2010, pp. 25 ff.). 
Due to the simplicity of the (linearized) play dynamics, this feedback-effect can be captured 
easily. In this paper a standard market supply&demand model is extended by play dynamics 
on the supply side. The forcing variable of the hysteretic sub-system (i.e. on the supply side) 
is the price level and the dependent variable is the supply quantity. Both are simultaneously 
determined by the whole market system of supply and demand. For different demand 
elasticity situations the resulting permanent equilibrium effects on price and quantity caused 
by transient exogenous demand shocks are calculated. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: After presenting the microeconomic 
implications of (sunk-cost) hysteresis (Ch. 2), an intuition of the consequences of aggregating 
over heterogeneous agents is given and the linearized approximation of the aggregate 
dynamics by play-hysteresis is described (Ch. 3). In Ch. 4 a supply side with play dynamics is 
integrated into a market model, and permanent (“remanence”) effects of transient demand 
shocks on the equilibrium are derived for different demand elasticity situations. Chapter 5 
concludes. 
2. Hysteresis in a microeconomic perspective 
Consider a simple microeconomic example with sunk market-entry costs (Baldwin, 1989; 
Dixit, 1989): In order to sell in the market, a previously inactive firm must expend market-
entry investments, e.g. in setting up a distribution and service network or for introductory 
sales promotion. These entry cost are sunk, since the expenses are firm-specific and cannot be 
regained if the firm later wants to leave the market. An inactive firm will only enter the 
market if the sunk entry costs are covered by revenues. Thus, the price that triggers an entry 
(pin in Fig. 1) exceeds the variable unit costs (pc). Moreover, if sunk exit costs are relevant, an 
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active firm will only exit if the losses under continuation of activity are larger than the sunk 
exit costs. Hence the exit trigger pout is lower than variable unit costs. Entry and exit triggers 
differ in a situation with sunk entry and/or exit costs. The micro path-dependence is based on 
discontinuous switches of the activity state if entry or exit triggers are passed. Between both 
triggers a ‘band of inaction’ occurs (Baldwin, 1989, pp. 7 f.). Inside this band, the current 
level of the input/forcing variable (price) does not unambiguously determine the current state 
of the output/dependent variable (firm’s activity), since the relation shows two path-
dependent equilibria (‘branches’).3 If a temporary change of the input variable leads to a 
switch between these equilibria/branches,4 a permanent effect on the output variable (called 
“remanence”) remains. This after-effect is the constituting feature of hysteresis. 
Fig. 1 – Discontinuous micro hysteresis loop (‘non-ideal relay’): 
market activity of a single firm 
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Uncertainty about the future development concerning the determinants of the firm’s profits 
reinforces the hysteresis characteristics via option value effects.5 Since an exit will destroy 
sunk investments in the market, an active firm may stay even if it is currently losing money 
                                                 
3 Krasnosel'skii/Pokrovskii (1989, p. 263 and p. 271) call this dynamic pattern “non-ideal relay”. See Bro-
kate/Sprekels, 1996, pp. 23 f., for a general description of relay-hysteresis. The original magnetic hysteresis 
of a single iron-crystal (i.e. at micro level) shows exactly this pattern. 
4 Passing of microeconomic triggers usually results from “large shocks”. Thus, studies implicitly relying on 
non-ideal relay-hysteresis, point out the difference between large shocks triggering permanent effects and 
small ones that do not. See e.g. the titles of Baldwin/Krugman, 1989, and Baldwin/Lyons, 1994, and see the 
abstract of Evans/Honkapohja, 1993. 
5 For a comprehensive treatment of uncertainty effects see Dixit/Pindyck (1994). 
– 5 – 
due to low prices. If the low price would later prove to be only transitory, an immediate exit 
could turn out to be a mistake. Hence, under uncertainty the opportunity of a “wait-and-see”-
strategy shifts the exit-trigger to the left, and analogously the entry-trigger to the right (since a 
currently favourable price could turn out to be only transitory). I.e. the “band of inaction” is 
widened by uncertainty. 
This first example refers to the supply of final products. However, sunk adjustment costs of 
changing market activity in general can result in hysteresis effects on markets.6 A prominent 
example on factor markets is hysteresis on labour markets based on sunk hiring and firing 
costs (Blanchard/Summers, 1986, and Bentolila/Bertola, 1990). 
Beside sunk-costs, several other economic factors may result in hysteretic path-dependence. 
E.g. Learning-by-doing based on production activity results in permanently reduced unit costs 
(and with this in an increased supply) based on a temporarily increased production quantity. 
On the demand side, the penetration of a (new) market may require a temporary decrease in 
prices. After risk-averse consumers have made favourable experiences with the temporarily 
cheap product, the willingness to pay more for a now well-known product is increased. All 
these mechanisms are based on transient factors resulting in permanent effects. The temporary 
increase of training costs resulting in cost reducing experience or the initial revenue reduction 
in order to open a market can in a general view be seen as (sunk) “investments” in future 
profits (since these expenditures can not be regained). The ex-ante decision (before the sunk 
costs were paid) differs from the ex-post situation (when the “investment” was carried out). 
As the relevant marginal costs respectively the revenues are changed, the same exogenous 
situation results in a different path-dependent reaction. Thus, a temporary exogenous 
disturbance can have permanent effects – which characterises hysteresis. 
3. Aggregate market supply with play-hysteresis 
On a microeconomic level of a single economic unit (i.e. firm) hysteresis occurs via a band of 
inaction, i.e. a gap between two triggers. Belke/Göcke (2001, 2005) focus on the shape of a 
                                                 
6 See Froot/Klemperer, 1989, p. 638, for a systematisation of factors generating hysteresis on the supply and 
on the demand side. 
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macro hysteresis loop and on the consequences of aggregation.7 Aggregation is not trivial if 
heterogeneity, e.g. regarding the level of variable costs, the value of sunk exit/entry costs 
and/or the level of uncertainty about future market situation is taken into account, i.e. if the 
entry and exit triggers are different between firms. In the realistic case of heterogeneity, a 
transition from the micro level of a firm to the aggregate level of entire supply in a market 
leads to a change of the hysteresis pattern. 
Fig. 2 – Aggregation for 3 heterogeneous firms 
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In order to give an intuition of the implications of aggregation, Fig. 2 shows a very simple 
example of only 3 firms, with heterogeneous non-ideal relay reactions. The individual firm’s 
supply is depicted for firms A, B and C in the lower part of the diagram, while the dynamics 
of the aggregate supply is illustrated in the upper part of Fig. 2. If no firm was initially active 
(i.e. for a very low initial price level), a monotonously increasing price will result in an entry 
of firm B at price pinB, firm C will start activity at price pinC > pinB, and a price-level above pinA > pinB 
will cause an entry of firm A. If later on the price decreases monotonously, for a price lower 
than poutC  the firm C, and for p below poutB  < poutC  the firm B will exit. If the price falls to p < poutA , 
no firm will be active anymore. If the micro behaviour is characterized by non-ideal relays, 
                                                 
7 For a suitable aggregation procedure from micro to macro hysteresis – the Preisach (1935) model – see 
Mayergoyz (1986). For applications to economics see e.g. Amable/Henry/Lordon/Topol (1991), Cross 
(1994), Piscitelli/Cross/Grinfeld/Lamba (2000), and Göcke (2002). 
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the aggregate supply loop for all firms together shows a kind of “stairway” (i.e. a step 
function) for increasing and for decreasing prices – with a band-of-inaction between the 
“stairway-up” and the “stairway-down” region. The higher the number hysteretic firms which 
are underlying the aggregation procedure, the smaller is the relative size of the individual 
firm’s “steps”, converging towards a more and more continuously looking aggregate reaction 
on both “stairways”. 
Belke/Göcke (2001, 2005) show – based on an explicit aggregation procedure – that even the 
aggregate behaviour is characterized by areas of weak reactions which can – corresponding to 
play in mechanics – be called “play”.8 As far as changes occur inside some play area, there 
are no persistent aggregate effects from small changes in the forcing variables. However, if 
changes go beyond the play area, sudden strong reactions (and persistence effects) of the 
output variable occur.9 However, play-hysteresis is in two aspects different to the micro non-
ideal relay-loop. First, the play-loop shows no discontinuities. Second, analogous to 
mechanical play (e.g. when steering a car) the play/inaction area is shifted with the history of 
the forcing variable: Every change in the direction of the movement of the forcing variable 
starts with traversing a play area. Only after this play is passed, a stronger reaction (called 
“spurt”) will result, if the forcing variable continues to move in the same direction. 
Fig. 3 gives an impression of play dynamics for the simple case of linear segments – as 
described by Belke/Göcke (2001, 2005). In our example, the dependent variable is the 
aggregate supply quantity y on a market and the forcing variable is the price level p. 
Preceding price increases had led to an initial situation in starting point A (price p0) located 
on the upward leading (right) spurt line. Changing direction (i.e. now the price decreases) 
results in entering the play area. A weak play reaction results until the entire play area of 
absolute width γ (> 0) is passed. The downward leading spurt line starts in point G at p5 (with: 
γ = p0 – p5). In the play area (between points A and G) only a weak reaction of the dependent 
variable y results from changes in the forcing variable p. A further decrease of p would induce 
a strong response of y along the (left) downward leading spurt line. 
                                                 
8 For play hysteresis, see Krasnosel’skii/Pokrovskii (1989), pp. 6 ff., and Brokate/Sprekels (1996, pp. 24 f. and 
pp. 42 ff.). For an example of implicit play-hysteresis in economics see Delgado (1991, Fig. 2, p. 472) where 
the price-stickiness as a result of menu-costs is analysed. 
9 See Pindyck (1988), pp. 980 f., Dixit/Pindyck (1994), pp. 15 f., for a non-technical description of “spurts” 
based on a microeconomic sunk cost mechanism. 
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Fig. 3 – Linear play-hysteresis and spurt areas 
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Alternatively, think of a price increase starting from p0 (A) up to p1 (point B) and a 
subsequent decrease to p2 (C). The corresponding reaction of y first evolves along the right 
spurt line from A → B. With this movement the relevant play area is vertically upward-
shifted, from line GA to line EB (γ = p0 – p5 = p1 – p3). Now a decrease from p2 (C) to p3 (E) 
takes place in a play area.10 This play area is partially penetrated in point C by an extent ‘a’. A 
further price decrease p2 → p3 → p4 (with trajectory points C → E → F) leads to passing the 
entire play width γ in point E (p3), followed by a strong reaction on the downward leading 
(left) spurt line until point F. On this spurt-down line, a further price decrease suddenly leads 
to a strong decrease of the supply quantity. However, this (continuous) change in behaviour is 
not a constant trigger level as in the micro loop, but path-dependent, since the play lines are 
vertically shifted by movements along the spurt lines. The play area is shifted in the opposite 
direction as before, so that for a subsequent increase back to p4 → p3 the reaction is described 
by a weak play reaction (F → H). 
Actually, interpreted in terms of Fig. 2 the spurt-lines are a kind of continuous “stairway-up/-
down” reaction due to aggregation over a large number of heterogeneous firms, and the width 
γ of the play area is related to the distance between both “stairways”. Of course, using play 
                                                 
10 In the case of mechanical play there would be even no reaction of y inside the play area (Krasno-
sel’skii/Pokrovskii, 1989, p. 8). 
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dynamics with linear segments and a constant play width11 is a simplified way to capture 
macro/aggregate dynamics. The slope of the branches of the aggregate loop depends on the 
distribution of the trigger values of the firms and is in general non-linear.12 However, even 
non-linear aggregate loops can be seen as approximated by the kinked play-loop. 
In the following, we present the basic principles of a play algorithm which was developed by 
Belke/Göcke (2001) for the analysis of play-hysteresis in employment.13 The change (Δp) in 
the forcing/input variable p may occur either inside the play area inducing a weak reaction or 
on a spurt line resulting in a strong reaction of the dependent/output variable y (Δy). The 
movement of p inside the play area is Δa (cumulated as ‘a’), and the movement in the spurt 
area is Δs. We consider a special case, when Δp starts from a spurt-line and enters a play area, 
denoted as Δpj. This corresponds to trajectory B → C → E in Fig. 3. In the past, the movement 
of p has led to (j – 1) changes between the left and the right spurt line. The new change Δpj 
may enter the play area to an extent of aj (in Fig. 3 for point C the distance to point B 
illustrates distance ‘aj’) or even pass the entire play γ (at point E) and enter the opposite spurt 
line by the last part Δsj (i.e. E → F). These considerations are summarized by: 
(1) Δpj = aj + Δsj  with:  Δsj = ⎩⎨
⎧ sgn(Δpj) ⋅ (|Δpj| – γ)   if   (|Δpj| – γ) > 0
 0   else
 
The change (Δy) in the output variable y caused by Δpj is composed of the weak play reaction 
(B → E) and – occasionally – by a strong spurt reaction (E → F). Let the parameter α denote 
the slope of the weak play area and (α + β) the strong spurt slope: 
(2) Δyj = α ⋅ aj + (α + β) ⋅ Δsj  with:  |α| < |α + β| 
The play line is shifted vertically by spurt movements. The cumulated vertical displacement 
Vj–1 of the relevant play line as a result of all previous movements on both spurt lines is:  
                                                 
11 Since uncertainty results – due to option value effects – in a widening of the band of inaction on a micro-
level, increased uncertainty which is prevalent on the whole market (for all firms) will result in a widening 
of the play area on the aggregate level. For an integration of these effects into a play loop (and an 
econometric estimation of play dynamics in a situation with variable exchange rate uncertainty for exporting 
firms) see Belke/Göcke (2005). 
12 This would result from using the explicit Preisach (1935)/Mayergoyz (1986) aggregation procedure. 
13 Based on Portuguese firm-level data, Mota (2008), pp. 99 ff., and Mota/Varejão/Vasconcelos (2012) use this 
linear play-algorithm to estimate and compare aggregate employment hysteresis with micro level adjustment 
patterns. Belke/Göcke/Günther (2012) apply the algorithm empirically in order to estimate play dynamics for 
German exports. 
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(3) Vj–1 = β ⋅ 
⎣⎢
⎢⎡
⎦⎥
⎥⎤∑
i=0
j–1
 Δsi  = β ⋅ sj–1  with:  sj–1 ≡ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δsi 
The dependent variable is determined by the shift Vj–1 resulting from past spurts and by the 
current reaction Δyj: 
(4) yj = C* + Vj–1 + Δyj  =  C* + β ⋅ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δsi + α ⋅ aj + (α + β) ⋅ Δsj 
   ⇒ yj = C* + β ⋅ ∑
i=0
j
 Δsi + α ⋅ Δpj  =  C* – α ⋅ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δpi + β ⋅ ∑
i=0
j
 Δsi + α ⋅ (∑
i=0
j–1
 Δpi + Δpj) 
   ⇒ yj = C + α ⋅ pj + β ⋅ sj with:  C ≡ C* – α ⋅ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δpi  and  pj = ∑
i=0
j
 Δpi 
Eq. (4) shows that the complex dynamics of the play loop are captured by a simple linear 
equation, where only an artificial variable sj is added. This “spurt variable” sj summarizes all 
preceding and present spurt movements leading to shifts of the play area. According to eq. (1) 
the spurt variable sj is just the series pj of the original forcing variable where all small 
movements (aj) inside the play areas (with width γ) are filtered out. The coefficient β of this 
“filtered” input series sj is the difference in slope between the play and the spurt reaction 
regarding price changes. Summarizing, the complex dynamics are captured in a simple 
linear(ized) way, just by adding only two new parameters to the model: (1) play width γ (for 
filtering price ‘p’ to get spurt ‘s’), and (2) the slope difference β of spurt sections compared to 
play sections. 
4. Play on the supply-side in a market model  
4.1 Perfectly elastic demand and exogenous price 
In a situation with perfectly elastic demand, the price level is completely determined by 
demand. In Fig. 4 (where – as it is not common in economics – the price/input is on the 
horizontal abscissa and the resulting quantity/output is on the vertical ordinate), perfect 
demand elasticity is represented by a vertical demand curve. Actually, from the supply side’s 
perspective, the price level is exogenous. Thus, in this special case the forcing variable p of 
the supply-subsystem of the entire market model is an exogenous variable. Implicitly, the case 
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of exogeneity of the forcing hysteresis variable is often assumed if hysteresis is modelled in 
economics.14 
Fig. 4 – Supply with play and perfectly elastic demand (i.e. exogenous price) 
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The interpretation is analogous to the explanations in the previous section. However, we can 
use this simple special case in order to present some further definitions. Starting from an 
initial situation in point A (Fig. 4, with demand D0, price p0, and quantity y0), a demand/price 
increase to D1 (p1) results in a strong spurt reaction on the spurt-up line with slope (α + β) to 
point B with quantity y1. A later price decrease back to D0 (p0) takes place on a play line with 
slope α (point C and y2). Although the price is on its initial level (p0) again, an after effect – 
called “remanence” – on the quantity remains: i.e. the distance between A and C, resp. 
Δyrem = (y2 – y0). With a further price decrease, passing the play area in point E and going on 
along the spurt-down line, for demand D3 (price p3) in point F the initial quantity y0 is 
regained. This kind of “overshooting” of the forcing variable Δpcoer = (p3 – p0), which is 
necessary to reach the initial state of the dependent variable, is called “coercivity” or 
“coercive force”. The initial point A is reached again (and a full hysteresis-loop is 
completed), if the price continues to decrease until p4 (point G) and if then a price increase 
passes the play are up to point A. 
                                                 
14 Counterexamples are e.g. Baldwin/Lyons (1994), Ljungqvist (1994) and Göcke (2001) for a foreign trade 
subsystem with hysteresis as part of an entire macroeconomic model. There the exchange rate (as the forcing 
variable for foreign trade) is endogenously determined by the whole macroeconomic model/system. 
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4.2 Completely inelastic demand and endogenous price 
In a market with a perfectly inelastic demand the equilibrium quantity is determined by the 
fixed demand quantity D¯. Thus, in this special case the level of the output variable of the 
hysteretic subsystem is exogenously given, while the equilibrium level of the price (as the 
hysteretic input variable) is determined endogenously. The demand curves now are horizontal 
if the prices are on the horizontal axis (see Fig. 5). In an initial situation on a spurt line (point 
A), the quantity is determined by exogenous demand quantity (y0 = D¯0). An increase of 
demand by ΔD¯1 = (D¯1 – D¯0) results in an identical increase in y. If this change takes place on a 
spurt line (as for trajectory A → B in Fig. 5), the resulting endogenous price effect 
Δp(spurt) = p1 – p0  is relatively small. In comparison, for ΔD¯2 = (D¯2 – D¯0), if the reaction at first 
passes play (as for trajectory A → C → G), the resulting price effect Δp(pass) = p2 – p0 is 
relatively large in size. 
Fig. 5 – Supply with Play and inelastic demand (i.e. exogenous quantity) 
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The supply quantity y is described by the play&spurt equation (index j is omitted for reasons 
of simplicity): 
(5) y = C + α ⋅ p + β ⋅ s 
The demand (quantity) function D in case of an inelastic demand is:  D = D¯. Thus, market 
equilibrium is: 
(6) y = D    ⇒    D¯ = C + α ⋅ p + β ⋅ s 
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A change in the exogenous demand quantity ΔD¯ leads to an endogenous price reaction Δp. 
This price reaction is different if it takes place inside play or on a spurt line. If the change is 
continuing a movement on the current spurt line (as e.g. for trajectory A → B), the large spurt-
slope (α + β) is relevant. In this case the change in the price Δp is equivalent to the change in 
the spurt variable Δs: 
(7) if continuation on spurt-line:  Δp = Δs 
  ⇒ Δy = ΔD¯ = α ⋅ Δp(spurt) + β ⋅ Δs  =  (α + β) ⋅ Δp(spurt)   ⇒   Δp(spurt) = ΔD¯α + β 
If the movement appears only inside the play, no change of the spurt variable occurs, and the 
low play-slope α is relevant: 
(8) if inside play area:  Δs = 0   ⇒   Δy = ΔD¯ = α ⋅ Δp(play)   ⇒   Δp(play) = ΔD¯α  
Due to the lower slope α, representing a weak reaction of supply on price changes, the price 
effect of an exogenous demand change in the play area is stronger than on a spurt line (with 
slope α + β). 
If the movement starts with entering the play area, according to eq. (1) price changes first 
appear inside play (‘a’), and if play is passed [if a = sgn(Δp) ⋅ γ] going further on the opposite 
spurt-line (Δs ≠ 0): 
(9) if play is passed (starting from spurt):  Δp = sgn(Δp) ⋅ γ + Δs 
  ⇒ Δs = Δp – sgn(Δp) ⋅ γ  =  Δp – sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ 
  ⇒ Δy = ΔD¯ = α ⋅ Δp + β ⋅ Δ s = α ⋅ Δp + β ⋅[Δp – sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ]  = (α + β) ⋅ Δ p – β ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ 
  ⇒ Δp(pass) = ΔD¯α + β + 
β
α +β ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ  =  sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ + 
ΔD¯ – α ⋅ sgn(D¯) ⋅ γ
α + β  
  ⇒ Δs = ΔD¯ – α ⋅ sgn(D¯) ⋅ γα + β  
In Fig. 5 this is illustrated by trajectory A → C → G with a decrease in demand of ΔD¯2
 = (D¯2 – D¯0 < 0): If a past upward spurt movement has led to point A on the spurt-up line, now 
changing the direction means entering the play area. With the price decrease (p3 – p0 = – γ <0) 
the play is passed (A → C). After reaching the opposite spurt-down line the rest of the price 
effect (C → G) is captured by a decrease in the spurt variable (with Δs = p2 – p3 <0). The entire 
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price effect of the decrease in demand ΔD¯2 is  Δp(pass) = – γ + Δs = p2 – p0 (<0). This entire price 
effect of demand changes is the bigger the larger is the width γ of the play area. 
If the movement starts inside play and passes the rest of the play area, calculation is analogous 
to eq. (9), however instead of the entire width of play (γ) the remaining distance to the spurt-
line must be applied. 
4.3 Endogenous price in a situation with “normal” price elasticity of demand 
For a more general situation without perfect (in)elasticity the general demand function is: 
(10) D = D¯ – δ ⋅ p 
Market equilibrium for this general case is: 
(11) y = D   ⇒   D¯ – δ ⋅ p = C + α ⋅ p + β ⋅ s 
Fig. 6 – Supply with play and “normal” price elasticity of demand 
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A change in the exogenous demand quantity ΔD¯ again leads to an endogenous price reaction 
Δp. If this occurs on a spurt-line (e.g. in Fig. 6 trajectory A → B on the spurt-down for a 
decreasing demand ΔD¯1 < 0) this is: 
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(12) if continuation on spurt-line:  Δp = Δs 
  ⇒ Δy = ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ Δp(spurt)  = α ⋅ Δp(spurt) + β ⋅ Δs  =  (α + β) ⋅ Δp(spurt) 
  ⇒ Δp(spurt) = ΔD¯α + β + δ 
  ⇒ Δy(spurt) = ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ Δp(spurt)  =  ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ ΔD¯α + β + δ  =  
α + β
α + β + δ ⋅ ΔD¯ 
If the movement is only inside the play, there is no change in s: 
(13) if inside play area:  Δs = 0 
  ⇒ Δy = ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ Δp(play) = α ⋅ Δp(play)   ⇒   Δp(play) =  ΔD¯α + δ 
  ⇒ Δy(play) = ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ Δp(play)  =  ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ ΔD¯α + δ    =  
α
α + δ ⋅ ΔD¯ 
If the movement starts with entering the play area and if play is passed and goes ahead on the 
opposite spurt line (in Fig. 6: e.g. trajectory A → C → G for an increase in demand of ΔD¯2) the 
following results: 
(14) if play is passed (starting from spurt):  Δs = Δp – sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ 
  ⇒ Δy = ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ Δp = α ⋅ Δp + β ⋅ Δ s =  (α  + β) ⋅ Δ p – β ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ 
  ⇒ Δp(pass) = ΔD¯α + β + δ + 
β
α + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ     ⇒   Δs = 
ΔD¯ – (α + δ) ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ
α + β + δ  
  ⇒ Δy(pass) = ΔD¯ – δ ⋅ Δp(pass)  =  α + βα + β + δ ⋅ ΔD¯ – 
δ ⋅ β
α + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯) ⋅ γ 
If a past downward spurt movement has led to point A, now a rising demand, by changing the 
direction, leads to entering the play area. With the resulting price increase (p3 – p0 = γ > 0) the 
play is passed (A → C). After reaching the opposite spurt-up line the rest of the price effect 
(C → G) is captured by an increase in the spurt variable (with Δs = p2 – p3 > 0). The entire price 
effect of the increase in demand ΔD¯2 is  Δp(pass) = γ + Δs = p2 – p0 (> 0). 
Compared to the simple case with perfectly inelastic demand, the price reactions are now 
smaller in size (in the play as well as in the spurt area), since a part of the adjustment in a 
price elastic demand situation is done via adaptation of the demand quantity to changing 
prices, which is represented by the additional parameter δ in the denominators in eq. (14). 
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4.4 A “demand cycle” in a situation with normal price elasticity of demand 
Now we look at a “cycle”, i.e. a temporary change in demand which is later on 
exactly/completely compensated. I.e. Starting with an autonomous demand level D¯0, a change 
of ΔD¯1 results in the level D¯1. Later on, the initial level D¯0 is regained by a change of the same 
size, but the opposite sign: ΔD¯2 = (– ΔD¯1). For simplicity, in the following a starting point of a 
cycle is assumed to be on a spurt line. 
4.4.1 A cycle starting with passing play 
A cycle which starts with entering the play area, takes place along the play line, as long as the 
opposite spurt line is not reached. E.g., in Fig. 7, if starting from point A, a demand cycle 
which does not reach further than point B will just look like a linear forth and back reaction 
on the play line with a slope of α. However, a cycle which leads to a “full loop” (as depicted 
in Fig. 7 by the trajectory A → B → C → G → A), which is caused by a demand cycle of ΔD¯1
 (< 0) followed later by a compensating change of ΔD¯2 = (– ΔD¯1) is characterized by a path-
dependent reaction of both endogenous variables, price p and quantity y. 
Fig. 7 – Demand cycle, starting with passing play 
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Fig. 8 illustrates in a stylized way the relative dynamics of autonomous demand D¯ as well as 
the resulting endogenous price and quantity reactions on the trajectory A → B → C → G → A. 
Starting (at time t0) from point A, the play reaction from A → B on an initial decrease (ΔD¯1
 < 0) is based on a weak under-proportional quantity reaction (y0 → yB) but an over-
proportional price decrease (p0 → pB). On the subsequent spurt-down line (B → C) we see a 
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weak price (pB → p1) but a strong quantity effect (yB → y1). Later (in t1), starting the 
movement back to the initial level, at first passing play (C → G) results in a weak quantity 
(y1 → yG) and a strong price effect (p1 → pG), which is followed by a spurt reaction with a 
weak price (pG → p0) and a strong quantity effect (yG → y0). After finishing the cycle (in t2) we 
regain the initial situation in point A and no remanence effect remains. 
Fig. 8 – Stylized time-path of autonomous demand (D¯), price (p) and quantity (y) 
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Fig. 9 – Play-loops of quantity (y) and price (p) for an autonomous demand (D¯) cycle 
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The reaction of price and quantity to changes of the autonomous demand D¯ can be illustrated 
in a (D¯,y)- and a (D¯,p)-diagram, which is done simultaneously in Fig. 9. The resulting loops 
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look, at first sight, as the play-loops in the (p,y)-diagram. For the (D¯,y)-loop the assignment is 
analogous: the flat-slope parts correspond to the play area and the steep parts to spurt lines. 
However, the (D¯,p)-loop is different: The strong price reaction corresponds to the play area in 
the original (p,y)-loop. 
4.4.2 A cycle starting with a continuation on the spurt-line 
A movement on the spurt line (in Fig. 10, e.g. from point A → B, caused by ΔD¯1 > 0), where 
the first change is exactly compensated later on (by ΔD¯2 = (– ΔD¯1) < 0, trajectory B → C → G), 
results – although the initial demand curve D0 is valid again – in a permanent after effect of 
both endogenous variables: as a result of a temporary increase of demand a negative 
remanence in the price level (Δprem = p2 – p0 <0) and a positive remanence effect in the 
equilibrium quantity (Δyrem = y2 – y0 > 0) results. 
Fig. 10 – Demand cycle, starting with continuation on spurt line 
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The remanence effects can be calculated using the result of eqs. (12) to (14). According to eq. 
(12) the price and quantity effect of ΔD¯1 on the spurt line (point A → B) is: 
(15) on spurt-line (point A → B):  Δp1 = ΔD¯1α +β + δ   and   Δy1 = 
α + β
α + β + δ ⋅ ΔD¯1 
The price effect of the move back ΔD¯2 = (– ΔD¯1) on trajectory B → C → G is at first inside the 
play area (B → C), and according to eq. (13): 
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(16) inside/passing play line (point B → C):  
 sgn(– ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ = Δp(B→C) = ΔD¯(B→C)α + δ     and     Δy(B→C) = 
α
α + δ ⋅ ΔD¯(B→C) 
  ⇒   γ = sgn(– ΔD¯1) ⋅ ΔD¯(B→C)α + δ     ⇔   ΔD¯(B→C) = sgn(– ΔD¯1) ⋅ (α + δ) ⋅ γ 
Only if a cycle is big enough in size, the movement back will pass the whole play area (as it is 
depicted in Fig. 10). This passing of play (with point C) requires a size of ⎪ΔD¯1⎪=⎪ΔD¯2⎪
>⎪ΔD¯(B→C)⎪ = (α + δ) ⋅ γ. If the entire play is passed, the remaining reaction (C → G) takes 
place on the opposite spurt line: 
(17) ‘rest’ on opposite spurt line (point C → G): 
 with    ΔD¯(C→G) = ΔD¯2 – ΔD¯(B→C) = – ΔD¯1 + sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ (α + δ) ⋅ γ 
  ⇒ Δp(C→G) = – ΔD¯1 + sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ (α + δ) ⋅ γα + β + δ  
The entire effects of the movement back ΔD¯2 are – if play is completely passed – analogous to 
eq. (14): 
(18) Δp2 = Δp(B→C) + Δp(C→G)  = – sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ + – ΔD¯1 + sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ (α + δ) ⋅ γα + β + δ   
  ⇒ Δp2 = – ΔD¯1α + β + δ + 
β
α + β + δ ⋅ sgn(–ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
  ⇒ Δy2 = – ΔD¯1 – δ ⋅ Δp2 = α + βα + β + δ ⋅ (– ΔD¯1) – 
β ⋅ δ
α + β + δ ⋅ sgn(–ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
The resulting endogenous permanent/remanence effects of the entire temporary ΔD¯1–ΔD¯2-
cycle (A → B → C → G) on price and quantity now are [if play is passed on the move back, i.e. 
if ⎪ΔD¯1⎪=⎪ΔD¯2⎪>⎪ΔD¯(B→C)⎪ = (α + δ) ⋅ γ ]: 
(19) Δprem = Δp1 + Δp2 = – βα + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
 Δyrem = Δy1 + Δy2 =  – δ ⋅ Δprem  =  β ⋅ δα + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
These results demonstrate, that the hysteretic after-effects are the more severe, the larger is 
the difference in slope (β) between play and spurt lines, and the larger is the play distance (γ) 
between both spurt lines, i.e. the more ‘kinked’ and ‘blown-up’ the loop looks like. 
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If the size of a cycle is not big enough to pass the play area on the move back [i.e. ΔD¯2 is so 
small that point C is not passed, this is relevant for ⎪ΔD¯1⎪=⎪ΔD¯2⎪<⎪ΔD¯(B→C)⎪ = (α + δ) ⋅ γ ], the 
remanence effects are: 
(20) Δprem,play = Δp1 + Δp(play)  =  ΔD¯1α + β + δ + 
–ΔD¯1
α + δ   =  
– β
(α + β + δ) ⋅ (α + δ) ⋅ ΔD¯1 
 Δyrem,play = – δ ⋅ Δprem,play  =  β ⋅ δ(α + β + δ) ⋅ (α + δ) ⋅ ΔD¯1 
In order to regain the initial quantity level of the dependent variable quantity (y0, in point H) 
the demand has to ‘overshoot’ its initial level: An additional counter move of the exogenous 
variable which is overcompensating the initial shock (ΔD¯1) is necessary. In the case of a “big” 
cycle (passing the play, ⎪ΔD¯1⎪ > (α + δ) ⋅ γ ), the coercive demand force ΔD¯coerz takes place on 
the opposite spurt-line and must correct for the quantity remanence Δyrem. Moreover, this 
extra demand change will induce an additional coercive price change Δpcoer (= pH – p2, in Fig. 
10), with the same direction as the price remanence effect (Δprem = p2 – p0). Since the 
coercivity change occurs on the opposite spurt-line, the following condition must hold: 
(21) cond. (I), reaction on spurt-line:  (– Δyrem ) = (α +β) ⋅ Δpcoer 
 ⇒   – β ⋅ δα + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ = (α + β) ⋅ Δpcoer   ⇒   Δpcoer = 
– β ⋅ δ
(α + β + δ) ⋅ (α + β) ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
Thus, in order to regain the initial quantity level (y0), e.g. after a temporary demand increase 
[sgn(ΔD¯1) > 0], there must be a compensation by a persistent price remanence effect Δprem plus 
an additional price coercive effect Δpcoer. The sum of both price effects (Δprem + Δpcoer = pH –
 p0) which is necessary for regaining the initial quantity y0 (in point H) is: 
(22) Δprem + Δpcoer = – βα + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ + 
– β ⋅ δ
(α + β + δ) ⋅ (α + β) ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
                       = 
– β
α + β ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
The adequate exogenous coercivity demand change ΔD¯coer can be calculated using the 
condition that the demand curve must be valid in the new path-dependent equilibrium: 
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(23) cond. (II), reaction on demand curve:   (– Δyrem ) = ΔD¯coer – δ ⋅ Δpcoer  
 ⇒   – β ⋅ δα + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ  =  ΔD¯coer – δ ⋅ 
– β ⋅ δ
(α + β + δ) ⋅ (α + β) ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
 ⇒  ΔD¯coer = – β ⋅ δα + β + δ ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ + δ ⋅ 
– β ⋅ δ
(α + β + δ) ⋅ (α + β) ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
                  = 
– β ⋅ δ
α + β  ⋅ sgn(ΔD¯1) ⋅ γ 
Thus, as with the remanence effects in eq. (20), the additional coercive demand change ΔD¯coer 
must be the larger the larger is the difference in slope (β) between play and spurt lines, and 
the larger is the play distance (γ) between both spurt lines. However, the lower is the reaction 
(δ) of the demand on price changes, the smaller is this coercive demand force ΔD¯coer; and for 
perfectly inelastic demand (δ=0) no coercive demand change is necessary to regain the initial 
quantity (as illustrated by Fig. 5). 
In markets with factors inducing path-dependent hysteretic behaviour – which is an 
implication in the case of sunk adjustment costs and thus should be very realistic – merely 
transient exogenous disturbances (as e.g. by ΔD¯1) can have permanent effects on the 
equilibrium level of the endogenous variables, i.e. prices and quantities. In order to overcome 
these after effects on the dependent variable (supply quantity) the exogenous disturbance must 
be overcompensated by an extra/coercive change (by ΔD¯coer with the opposite direction of the 
initial shock ΔD¯1). However, the consequence of the exogenous coercive (demand) force is 
even an additional effect (Δpcoer) on the equilibrium of the price level. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper the consequences of aggregate hysteresis on the supply side on the market 
equilibrium were illustrated. The path-dependent sub-system supply was only a part of the 
entire market model, while the forcing variable of the hysteric supply (the price) and the 
dependent variable (supply quantity) were both endogenous from the perspective of the entire 
market. This results in feedback effects on the equilibrium levels of both endogenous 
variables, price and quantity, if merely temporary exogenous disturbances affect the market 
for some time. Modelling of hysteresis was performed in a non-standard way: Not micro-level 
discontinuous-switching (between activity and inactivity) type path-dependence (so called 
“non-ideal relay”) was applied, but – more adequate if aggregate market supply is addressed 
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– hysteresis was modelled by a continuously switching type of aggregate/macro hysteresis 
which shows similarities to mechanical play. This allows capturing quite complex path-
dependent dynamics in a relatively simple way, just by two additional parameters leading to a 
linear supply equation: (1) the width of the inaction/play and (2) a difference of slope between 
play (inaction) zones and spurt (strong reaction) areas. Play-hysteresis is formally captured by 
a linear equation, extended by an additional variable (“spurt”), which is just the forcing 
variable where small changes (play) are filtered out. Due to this simple structure, the 
utilisation of play-hysteresis as part of more complex theoretic models is straightforward. 
Furthermore due to this formally simple linearized structure it is directly applicable to 
econometric estimation (as it was done for a single equation / partial equilibrium model by 
Belke/Göcke/Günther, 2012, and Mota/Varejão/Vasconcelos, 2012). 
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